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Matal v. Tam: Free Speech Meets 






In Matal v. Tam,1 which was decided at the end of the Supreme 
Court’s 2016 term, the Court relied on the Free Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment2 to strike down part of Section 2(a) of the 
Lanham Act.3 This longstanding provision of federal trademark 
law had allowed the government to refuse registration to 
trademarks found to “disparage” persons or groups.4 The collision 
between trademark law and Free Speech presented in Matal v. Tam 
turned out to pose surprisingly challenging legal issues.5 While all 
eight Justices participating agreed that the provision was 
unconstitutional,6 there was less consensus on why it was 
 
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. 
1. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2. 
3. Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012). 
4. Federal trademark law (known as the Lanham Act) provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on 
the principal register on account of its nature unless it—(a) Consists 
of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter 
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, 
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them 
into contempt, or disrepute . . . . 
Id. 
5. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
6. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the decision of the case. Id. at 1750. 
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unconstitutional, and no consensus as to the proper level of scrutiny 
for assessing such a challenge.7 As this Survey reflects, where 
matters touch on “commercial speech,”8 there are serious open 
issues in First Amendment doctrine that the Court failed to resolve 
in Matal v. Tam.9 
The case began when Simon Tam, the leader of an Asian- 
American rock band, sought to register “The Slants” as a trademark 
for his band.10 In choosing the band name “The Slants”—a term 
understood by many as a derogatory reference to Asian- 
Americans—Tam consciously intended to “reclaim” an ethnic slur 
as a source of ethnic pride.11 After considering the evidence 
relating to linguistic uses of the term “slants,” and its derogatory 
use in relation to Asian-Americans, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) concluded that the term “The Slants” 
was “disparaging” to a substantial part of the Asian-American 
community and refused to register it.12 
Tam appealed to the Federal Circuit, challenging both the 
agency’s conclusion that his mark was “disparaging,” and the 
constitutionality of the Lanham Act provision allowing the agency 
to reject “disparaging” trademarks.13 In a striking turn of events, 
 
7. Compare id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the case 
should be considered under a “heightened scrutiny” standard), and id. at 1769 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the case should be resolved under the 
“strict scrutiny” test), with id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding 
that the Court need not resolve the dispute as to whether the case should be 
resolved under the intermediate scrutiny test for commercial speech or under 
a different test). 
8. See id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
9. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744. 
10. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
11. See In re Tam (Tam En Banc Decision), 808 F.3d 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754 (Mr. Tam 
named his band The Slants “to ‘reclaim’ and ‘take ownership’ of stereotypes 
about people of Asian ethnicity.”). 
12. In re Tam, 108 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1305, 1310 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (finding 
“The Slants” mark to be disqualified from registration under Section 2(a) 
because “a substantial composite of the referenced group find the term 
objectionable.”). 
13. See In re Tam (Tam Panel Decision), 785 F.3d 567, 569 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“Mr. Tam argues that the Board erred in finding the mark THE SLANTS 
disparaging under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act and therefore unregistrable. Mr. 
Tam also challenges the constitutionality of § 2(a).”), reh’g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 600 F. App’x 775 (Fed. Cir.), and reh’g en banc, 808 F.3d 1321 
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the Federal Circuit sitting en banc used the case as the occasion to 
issue a major constitutional decision. In In re Tam, the court 
invalidated the disparagement provision of federal trademark law, 
which had been in place since 1946, and had been used for decades 
to reject trademark registrations.14 In so doing, the Federal Circuit 
reversed its own established precedent that Section 2(a)’s bar on 
“disparaging” trademarks did not violate the First Amendment.15 
Beyond overturning its dated precedent, a majority of the 
Federal Circuit articulated a new, dual-standard approach to free 
speech challenges in the commercial context: It held that the courts 
should review the government’s action strictly when it is directed 
at the “expressive character” of a trademark, but more leniently 
when it is directed at the “commercial-speech function of the 
mark.”16 While traditional free speech doctrine begins by focusing 
on the character of the speech in order to decide on a framework for 
review,17 the Federal Circuit shifted to an emphasis on the focus of 
the government rule.18 The decision generated a total of five 
opinions, including the majority, concurring, and dissenting 
 
 
(Fed. Cir.), as corrected (Feb. 11, 2016), cert. granted sub nom., Lee v. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 30 (2016), and aff’d sub nom., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
14. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1358 (“We hold that the 
disparagement provision of § 2(a) is unconstitutional because it violates the 
First Amendment.”). 
15. See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (holding that 
“[n]o conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed. 
Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by 
the refusal to register his mark [under Section 2(a)].”); see also In re Fox, 702 
F.3d 633, 635 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (following In re McGinley’s holding); see also In 
re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the mark was unable to be registered under section 2(a) because it contained 
“scandalous matter”); In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (quoting In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484). 
16. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1338 (“The disparagement 
provision must be assessed under First Amendment standards applicable to 
what it targets, which is not the commercial-speech function of the mark . . . . 
This is not a government regulation aimed at the commercial component of 
speech.”). 
17. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 
781, 787 (1988) (“We began our analysis by categorizing the type of speech at 
issue.”). 
18. For the reasons discussed below, this analysis represents an 
intriguing shift in the focus of the judicial analysis, but the particular 
formulation adopted by the Federal Circuit is problematic. See infra Section 
IV.A. 
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opinions, each offering different First Amendment theories.19 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, the appeal 
generated an intense flurry of interest, resulting in a stack of 
amicus curiae briefs on all sides of the issue from public interest 
groups, bar organizations, civil rights groups, law professors, and 
professional football organizations.20 Between the federal 
government’s defense of the law, Tam’s defense of the ruling below, 
and the views expressed by the numerous amici, there were a 
bewildering variety of proposals as to how the Court should 
approach the First Amendment free speech issue. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the case generated split 
decisions in the Supreme Court, just as it had in the Federal 
Circuit.21 There was complete agreement within the Court that the 
“disparagement” provision of Section 2(a) was unconstitutional 
under the First Amendment.22 All members of the Court also 
agreed on a well-established bedrock free speech principle: “Speech 
may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that 
offend.”23 Simply because Mr. Tam’s mark is offensive to other 
 
 
19. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct 1744, 1754–55 (2017) (Alito, J.) (majority 
opinion) (summarizing the “assortment of theories” expressed in the opinions 
generated in the en banc Federal Circuit decision). 
20. Matal v. Tam Docket, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (Sep. 25, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/15- 
1293.htm (listing amicus briefs filed). As this list hints, the outcome of the 
case was of direct interest to the Washington Redskins professional football 
team, whose team name was being challenged on the same legal grounds. See 
infra Section II. 
21. Justice Alito wrote an opinion announcing the judgment of the Court 
and an opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, and III-A of his opinion. Tam, 137 
S. Ct. 1744. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion, concurring only in Parts I, II, 
and III-A of the Alito opinion and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1767 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Thomas wrote an opinion, concurring in all 
parts of the Alito opinion except for Part II and concurring in the judgment. 
Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 1765 (plurality opinion) (deciding that “[f]or these reasons, we 
hold that the disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment. The judgment of the Federal Circuit is affirmed.”); see also id. at 
1750 (majority opinion) (laying out the voting tally, which shows that all 
Justices participating concurred in the Supreme Court’s judgment). 
23. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (announcing the judgment of the Court and an 
opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II, and III-A); see also id. at 1765 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of the First Amendment that 
the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of 
the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys.”). 
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Asian-Americans does not provide a constitutionally justifiable 
reason for the government to burden his speech by denying him the 
legal status afforded to registered trademarks.24 Beyond that, 
however, there was little common ground in the Justices’ reasoning. 
The split opinions in Matal v. Tam sowed further confusion on the 
issue of what degree of constitutional free speech protection should 
be afforded to “commercial speech,” and indeed, what even 
constitutes “commercial speech” in this context.25 
The discussion of these interesting constitutional questions 
proceeds below as follows: Part I lays the groundwork by explaining 
the significance of trademark registration and the benefits that a 
trademark owner derives from registration (and that are denied 
when registration is refused); Part II lays out the Supreme Court 
opinions in Matal v. Tam and explains the areas of constitutional 
agreement; Part III outlines the areas of constitutional dispute in 
Matal v. Tam, and parses the splintered decisions the case 
produced; and finally, Part IV analyzes which approach to the free 
speech issues presented is the most coherent way to approach the 
First Amendment in this context. 
I. TRADEMARK REGISTRATION AND THE LEGAL BENEFITS THAT 
FOLLOW 
Because the federal trademark registration scheme embodied 
in the Lanham Act26 is not a matter of common knowledge, a few 
basic points about trademarks are essential in order to understand 
the free speech issues addressed in Matal v. Tam.27 Three points, 
in particular, are important here: First, it is true that trademark 
rights are not created by federal law, and that a mark may be used 
by the owner whether or not it is federally registered, but at the 
same time, the significance of this “right” should not be 
understated;28 Second, federal registration requirements are not 
demanding, and successful federal registration of a trademark 
vastly expands the legal rights held by the owner of the mark both 
 
 
24. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Hustler Magazine, 
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988)). 
25. See id.; id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
26. Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012). 
27. See 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
28. See infra Section I.A. 
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substantively and procedurally;29 and Third, the “disparagement” 
provision at issue here is a small part of a broader federal 
regulatory program designed to protect rights in the commercial 
sphere and prevent unfair trade practices.30 These points are little 
understood by those who do not practice trademark law, but highly 
relevant when turning to the proper interpretation of the First 
Amendment as applied to Mr. Tam’s trademark dispute. 
A. The “Right” to Use a Trademark Without Federal Registration 
A trademark—such as “The Slants” for Mr. Tam’s band—is 
defined as “any word, symbol, name or other device . . . used by a 
person . . . to identify and distinguish [a trademark  owner’s 
goods] . . . from those manufactured or sold by others.”31 Such a 
mark provides a powerful way for a seller to promote and 
distinguish his or her products or services in the commercial 
marketplace.32 
A consumer need only look around to see the power of branding 
and the value of trademarks. From McDonald’s golden arches, to 
Apple’s distinctive white apple silhouette, to Nike’s “Just Do It,” 
there is no question that product trademarks, logos, and slogans 
are instantly recognizable to consumers—and thereby highly 
valuable to companies. While the definition of a “trademark”33 
comes from the Lanham Act, trademarks are not created by federal 
law. A trademark owner’s right to claim a particular mark to 
identify his goods or services was recognized at common law long 
before the federal Lanham Act created a national trademark 
registry in 1946.34 
 
 
29. See infra Section I.B. 
30. See infra Section I.C. 
31. Lanham Act § 45. 
32. While “trademarks” refer to marks used in connection with the sale of 
goods, the Act also allows for registration of other types of marks for products 
and services, including service marks, collective marks, and certification 
marks. See id. In the text above and below, all of these are collectively referred 
to as “trademarks.” 
33. Id. 
34. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Trademarks and their 
precursors have ancient origins, and trademarks were protected at common 
law and in equity at the time of the founding of our country.” (citations 
omitted)); see also, e.g., 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed. 2015). 
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This history is significant here for two reasons: first, it 
underscores the nature of a trademark as the owner’s private 
speech; and second, it follows that a trademark owner can use a 
trademark whether or not it is registered. The latter principle— 
that trademark owners still have the “right” to use their trademark 
even if registration is denied—was the basis for the original Federal 
Circuit holding that the agency’s power to refuse registration to 
“disparaging” trademarks did not implicate any free speech 
rights.35 In In re McGinley, the Federal Circuit reasoned that, 
because rejecting a trademark from registration, “does not affect 
[the owner’s] right to use it,” there could be no possible abridgement 
of the owner’s First Amendment rights.36 While the government 
raised the same rationale here, this point was rightly rejected by 
both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court as an unduly 
limited view of free speech rights.37 Modern Supreme Court 
doctrine recognizes that a burden on speech can violate the First 
Amendment as much as an outright ban.38 
Moreover, while a trademark owner has an ostensible legal 
right to use a mark even without registration, the value of this 
“right” should not be overstated. As the Federal Circuit has 
emphasized, it is “widely recognized that federal trademark 
registration bestows truly significant and financially valuable 
benefits upon markholders”—benefits unavailable if federal 
registration is denied.39 No competent trademark attorney would 
advise a client that it makes no difference whether or not the 
client’s trademark is federally registered.40 
 
35. See Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 571–72 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
36. 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“With respect to appellant’s First 
Amendment rights, it is clear that the PTO’s refusal to register appellant’s 
mark does not affect his right to use it . . . [n]o conduct is proscribed, and no 
tangible form of expression is suppressed. Consequently, appellant’s First 
Amendment rights would not be abridged by the refusal to register his mark.” 
(citation omitted)). 
37. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753; Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1339 
(rejecting the government’s argument that Section 2(a) “does not implicate the 
First Amendment because it does not prohibit any speech”). 
38. See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1340 (noting that 
“[l]awmakers may no more silence unwanted speech by burdening its utterance 
than by censoring its content” (citation omitted)). 
39. See id. (citation omitted). 
40. See Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark 
Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 605 (2011) (“[T]he incentives 
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B. The Benefits Afforded by Federal Registration 
Federal requirements for registering a trademark are not 
onerous.41 To qualify for federal registration, the owner must be 
seeking to register a trademark that is capable of “distinguishing” 
the goods or services from those offered by others in the same 
market (and not already in use for that purpose by another 
trademark owner).42 The owner of the mark must also show, or be 
prepared to show, that the trademark is being used “in commerce” 
in connection with particular goods or services.43 
If a trademark used to identify goods or services meets the test 
for “distinctiveness,” and is actually used in commerce by the 
trademark owner in selling the relevant goods or services, the 
trademark owner is presumptively entitled to federal registration 
of the trademark—and the agency has only limited grounds on 
which it may deny registration, including the “disparagement” 
provision at issue in Matal v. Tam.44 The trademark “The Slants” 
for a rock band would thus have qualified for federal registration 




to pursue federal registration . . . are now so significant as to make federal 
registration indispensable for any owner making an informed decision about 
its trademark rights. A federal registration is the only rational choice . . . .”). 
41. See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012) (setting out requirements 
for trademarks registrable on the principal register). The Lanham Act actually 
establishes two national trademark registries. First, the “Principal Register” 
is for registering trademarks that are being “used in commerce” or as to which 
the applicant has a “bona fide” intent to use in commerce within the near 
future. See id. §§ 1(a)(1), (b)(1). Second, the “Supplemental Register” is for 
registering trademarks that are “capable of distinguishing the applicant’s 
goods or services” but not yet registrable on the Principal Register. See id. 
§ 23(a). Because trademarks on the Supplemental Register do not yet get the 
full protections of trademark law, and because the Supplemental Register is 
not otherwise important for purposes of Tam, the discussion will address only 
registration in the context of the Principal Register. 
42. See id. § 2 (“No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be 
distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration” except on 
specified and limited grounds.). 
43. See id. § 1(a)(1) (“The owner of a trademark used in commerce may 
request registration of its trademark on the principal register . . . .”). 
44. See id. § 2 (stating that “[n]o trademark by which the goods of the 
applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused 
registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless” subject 
to an express exception). 
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members of the Asian-American community.45 
Successful registration of a trademark dramatically expands 
the trademark owner’s rights, both as a substantive matter and as 
a procedural matter.46 The Supreme Court has emphasized, in its 
trademark decisions, that the “Lanham Act confers important legal 
rights and benefits on trademark owners who register their 
marks.”47 This emphasis is important for First Amendment 
purposes because free speech rights can be infringed in many ways, 
including through the denial of benefits. 
Most importantly, federally registering a trademark expands 
the substantive legal rights held by the trademark owner.48 In the 
absence of federal registration, if a trademark owner has any 
common law rights, they are “limited to the territory in which the 
mark is known and recognized” by consumers.49 In passing the 
Lanham Act, Congress consciously set about to expand upon 
common law protection by giving the owner of a federally registered 
trademark the right to exclusive nationwide use of that mark.50 
This statutory right to nationwide use of a federally registered 
trademark excludes only those limited geographic areas, if any, in 
which another person’s use of the same mark for the same product 
precedes federal registration.51 Federal registration of a mark 
 
 
45. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(“Under the Lanham Act, the PTO must register source-identifying 
trademarks unless the mark falls into one of several categories of marks 
precluded from registration.”). 
46. See MCCARTHY, supra note 34, at §§ 19:9, :11 (“Registration of a mark 
on the federal Principal Register confers a number of procedural and 
substantive legal advantages over reliance on common law rights . . . 
[r]egistration on the Principal Register should be attempted if it is at all 
possible.”). 
47. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 
(2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
48. See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1345 (“Federal 
trademark registration brings with it valuable substantive and procedural 
rights unavailable in the absence of registration.”). 
49. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 26:2 (5th ed. 2017). 
50. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328. 
51. See id. at 1328; Burger King of Fla., Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 908 
(“Congress expanded the common law, however, by granting an exclusive right 
in commerce to federal registrants in areas where there has been no offsetting 
use of the mark.”); see also Lanham Act §§ 22, 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1115 
(2012). 
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grants mark-holders a critical substantive right, not available 
outside of the Lanham Act, by expanding the geographic scope of 
the owner’s exclusive rights to use the trademark.52 
A number of procedural benefits also follow from federal 
registration of a mark. A federally registered mark is “presumed to 
be valid” in any federal trademark litigation.53 “[T]he mark 
becomes incontestable (with certain exceptions) after five years of 
consecutive post-registration use . . . .”54 The holder of a registered 
mark “may sue in federal court to enforce his trademark,”55 and 
“may recover treble damages if he can show infringement was 
willful.”56 The owner of a registered mark “may also obtain the 
assistance of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in restricting 
importation of infringing or counterfeit goods,”57 and qualifies “for 
a simplified process for obtaining recognition and protection of his 
mark in countries that have signed the Paris Convention . . . .”58 
“Lastly, registration operates as a complete defense to state or 
common law claims of trademark dilution.”59 
 
52. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328. Oddly, this key 
substantive benefit from federal registration is not mentioned in any of the 
Supreme Court opinions in Tam. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
53. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328–29 (citing Lanham Act 
§ 7(b)). 
54. Id. at 1329 (citing Lanham Act § 15); see also B & B Hardware, Inc. 
v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015) (“Incontestability is a 
powerful protection.”). 
55. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1329 (citing Lanham Act § 39). 
56. Id. (citing Lanham Act § 35). 
57. Id. (citing Lanham Act § 42). 
58. Id. (citing Lanham Act § 62; Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property, art. 6 quinquies, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305). 
59. Id. (citing Lanham Act § 43(c)(6)). Moreover, so long as Section 2(a) 
stands, the value of state law protections for an unregistrable mark such as 
“The Slants” should not be overstated. It is true that state trademark rights 
co-exist with the Lanham Act, and can provide a separate source of legal 
protection for trademarks generally. But the Federal Circuit has observed that 
“[w]hether a user of an unregistrable, disparaging mark has any enforceable 
common law rights is at best unclear.” Id. at 1344. The Federal Circuit has 
emphasized, similarly, that most states have adopted trademark registration 
statutes modelled on the Lanham Act, including its bar on registration of 
“disparaging” trademarks. See id. at 1343–44 (noting that the Model State 
Trademark Act, which includes a disparagement provision based on the 
Lanham Act’s Section 2(a), has been adopted by “virtually all states”). The 
Federal Circuit also raised questions as to whether the Lanham Act’s federal 
cause of action for unregistered marks could be utilized by a trademark holder 
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As this makes clear, the benefits that flow from federal 
trademark registration are invaluable. Conversely, as recognized 
by the Federal Circuit, “[d]enial of these benefits creates a serious 
disincentive to adopt a mark which the government may deem 
offensive or disparaging.”60 These realities about trademark law 
underscore the wisdom of the Federal Circuit in rejecting the view 
that Section 2(a) does not implicate any free speech rights because 
the trademark owner can still use the trademark.61 The benefits 
attendant to federal registration are extremely valuable, and, as 
the Supreme Court recognized, the denial of these benefits to an 
otherwise qualifying trademark creates a burden on speech 
sufficient to support a free-speech claim.62 
C. The Trademark Registry is a Regulation of Commerce 
The final point about trademark registration, which can be 
obscured by focusing too narrowly on Section 2(a)’s 
“disparagement” clause, is that this provision is a small part of a 
larger federal regulatory program designed to regulate the use of 
marks in the commercial marketplace.63 In deciding how to 
characterize trademarks—and whether they should be treated as 
commercial speech—it is important to understand this broader 
context. 
Congress had two purposes in creating a federal registry for 
trademarks in the Lanham Act. First, the Act was intended to 
“protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a 
product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, 
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.”64 Second, 
the Lanham Act was enacted to ensure that a trademark owner 
 
 
whose mark was rejected from registration because it “disparaged” a particular 
ethnic group. See id. at 1344–45 n.11. 
60. Id. at 1341. 
61. Id. at 1345. 
62. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (noting that federal 
registration “confers important legal rights and benefits on trademark owners 
who register their marks”). 
63. See, e.g., Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 581 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(explaining that “the trademark registration scheme is a prototypical example 
of a regulatory regime”). 
64. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992) (quoting S. REP. NO. 791333, 
at 3 (1946))). 
 2018] FREE SPEECH AND TRADEMARK LAW 133 
 
“can protect his ‘investment from . . . misappropriation by pirates 
and cheats.”65 
As the legislative history makes clear, both statutory goals 
behind the Lanham Act’s trademark registration scheme were 
market-oriented, with one goal focused on supporting consumer 
choice, and the other on protecting trademark owners’ 
investments.66 This dual focus is not surprising, given that the 
Lanham Act was enacted under the congressional authority 
granted by the Commerce Clause,67 and was consciously intended 
to help protect the “free flow of commerce.”68 
This point is important for free speech purposes because it ties 
directly to the debate in Matal v. Tam over free speech rights in the 
context of commercial speech. While Simon Tam expressed a wish 
to make a political statement with his choice of “The Slants” as his 
band name,69 the registration of that name as a trademark has a 
different function. 
To be eligible for federal registration, a trademark must be a 
brand name, and not simply a political statement.70 A message on 
a bumper sticker would not, for example, be a “trademark” that 
could be registered.71 Instead, the trademark would have to be the 
 
65. Id. (quoting Two Pesos, Inc., 505 U.S. at 782 n.15 (quoting S. REP. NO. 
791333, at 3 (1946))); see also Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 854–56 n.14 (1982) (“By applying a trademark to goods produced by one 
other than the trademark’s owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the 
goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to obtain . . . [a]t the same 
time, the infringer deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish among the 
goods of competing manufacturers.”). 
66. See, e.g., Park’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 
(1985) (“The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order 
to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business and to protect 
the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.”). 
67. See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1354 (emphasizing that 
“the Lanham Act derives from the Commerce Clause”). 
68. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1752 (2017). 
69. See, e.g., Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1328 (“Mr. Simon Shiao 
Tam named his band THE SLANTS to make a statement about racial and 
cultural issues in this country.”). Interestingly, in the administrative 
proceeding before the USPTO, Mr. Tam denied any intent to express a political 
view, and took the position that “the mark does not refer to people of Asian 
descent.” Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 570 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
70. See, e.g., In re Thomas J. Hulting d/b/a No More RINOs! Enterprises, 
107 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1175, 1177 (T.T.A.B. 2013). 
71. Id. (concluding that the trademark registration should be refused 
where applicant’s proposed “No More RINOs!” mark on t-shirts and bumper 
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brand name under which a particular line of bumper stickers is 
sold. Mr. Tam may have had politics in mind when choosing his 
band name, but federal trademark registration would not be 
available at all if he were simply seeking to make a political 
statement. 
In short, while there is a political component to the band’s 
name, Mr. Tam did not bring suit here objecting to the denial of a 
permit for his band to play in a public park because of their 
message, or raising another traditional free speech issue.72 
Instead, this case involved his wish to register “The Slants” as a 
federal trademark for his band.73 This presents more complex 
constitutional questions, not because it makes Section 2(a) any 
more appropriate as a government regulation, but because the issue 
arises in the context of a broad federal trademark scheme designed 
to regulate commercial activity. 
* * * * * 
With these basic trademark principles in mind, a better 
understanding of the Supreme Court’s decision in Matal v. Tam 
should be possible. We turn, first, to the areas in which the Court 
agreed on the application of free speech principles. 
II. AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT IN MATAL V. TAM 
With the Federal Circuit’s change of constitutional course in In 
re Tam,74 the stage was set for the Supreme Court to decide 
whether to take up the issue. The Federal Circuit’s ruling striking 
down Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause on free speech grounds 
created a circuit split, if a technical one, with the Fifth Circuit.75 
 
stickers, signifying “No Republicans In Name Only,” “conveys a political slogan 
devoid of sourceidentifying [sic] significance and therefore fails to function as 
a trademark.”). 
72. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
73. Id. 
74. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1357–58 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
75. See Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 578 n.9 
(5th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the trademark applicant’s argument “that prohibiting 
him from registering a mark with the PTO violates his first amendment rights” 
(citing In re Mavety Media Grp., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). This is 
more of a “technical” split because the Fifth Circuit’s decision did not contain 
any significant discussion of the First Amendment issue, but simply followed 
the earlier Federal Circuit position in In re McGinley on the constitutionality 
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Moreover, another case involving the same issue was 
proceeding through the federal court system at the same time as 
“The Slants” litigation, this one involving the trademarked team 
name of the Washington Redskins professional football team.76 
The Washington Redskins had faced a number of legal challenges 
seeking to cancel their trademark registration for the “Redskins.”77 
After successfully defeating such challenges over a two-decade 
period, the Redskins suffered a serious legal setback in 2014, when 
the USPTO cancelled the trademark registration for the Redskins 
team name on the ground that it was “disparaging” to Native 
Americans.78 The team appealed to the federal district court.79 In 
another legal setback for the team, the federal district judge first 
ruled that “Section 2(a) . . . does not implicate the First 
Amendment”80 and, second, affirmed the agency’s finding that the 
team name was disparaging.81 The Redskins case was on appeal to 
the Fourth Circuit at the very time that the Matal v. Tam case 
arrived at the Supreme Court.82 
Adding to the likelihood of convincing the Supreme Court to 
take the case, the Matal v. Tam case presented alluring and 
interesting issues that implicated free speech, civil rights, and 
trademark law.83 The particular type of “disparagement” in the 
 
 
of the “disparagement” clause. See 660 F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
76. See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 
2015). 
77. See, e.g., id.; Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d 498 (E.D. 
Va. 2014); Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 
(T.T.A.B. 2014); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (cert. 
denied); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Pro-Football, 
Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008); Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 
F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
78. See Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 
(T.T.A.B. 2014). 
79. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), 
reversed and remanded by Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 709 Fed. App’x 182 
(4th Cir. 2018) (mem) . 
80. Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. at 448. 
81. Id. at 490 (affirming the agency’s cancellation of the Redskins 
trademark as “disparaging” to Native Americans). 
82. In fact, the Redskins lawyers took the unusual step of seeking 
certiorari in the Supreme Court before the Fourth Circuit had ruled, but were 
rebuffed by the Court. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017); Pro-Football, Inc. 
v. Blackhorse, 137 S. Ct. 44 (2016). 
83. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
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Matal v. Tam case84—disparagement based on animosity to racial 
groups—excited public debate, and the basic legal questions 
presented were both interesting and challenging. Does the federal 
government really have to register trademarks that may contain 
vile racial epithets? Do such trademarks even enjoy free speech 
protection? And if they do, are there government interests that 
justify denying registration to such marks? Civil rights groups 
could not imagine that the government had to register such 
offensive trademarks. Constitutional scholars, on the other hand, 
perceived the case as a clear free speech issue. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and, as noted, 
numerous amici filed supporting and opposing briefs. By the time 
the Court issued its opinion in June of 2017, the many pages of ink 
spilled by the parties and amici in trying to illuminate the Supreme 
Court far exceeded the relatively short and splintered opinions 
issued by the voting Justices. The common ground among these 
opinions is explored more fully below. The points of constitutional 
dispute are specifically explored in Part III. 
A. The Court’s Unanimous Judgment: Section 2(a) Infringes Free 
Speech 
Matal v. Tam generated three separate opinions, authored, 
respectively, by Justice Alito,85 Justice Kennedy,86 and Justice 
Thomas.87 While disagreeing on core aspects of the First 
Amendment rationale, all participating Justices agreed on a 
bottom-line judgment: “[T]he disparagement clause violates the 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”88 Justice Alito 
 
 
84. Id. at 1753–57. 
85. See id. at 1751. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined in its entirety by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Breyer. Id. Justice Thomas joined all of 
Justice Alito’s opinion, except Part II, which addressed an issue of statutory 
interpretation that he believed had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 1769 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Parts III-B, III-C, and IV of Justice Alito’s opinion 
generated, at most, only four votes, and therefore, represent a plurality 
opinion. See id. at 1751. 
86. See id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Id. 
87. See id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
88. Id. at 1765 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (holding that the 
“disparagement clause violates the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment”). 
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commanded unanimity in stating the judgment of the Court. 
Holistically, the Court concluded that the Free Speech Clause does 
not permit the government to refuse registration to “disparaging” 
trademarks.89 
But while all of the Justices agreed as to how the case should 
come out, there was much less agreement as to why it should come 
out that way, though there were some areas of common ground. 
Justice Alito’s basic description of the facts and summary of the 
benefits of trademark registration were joined by all Justices.90 
Likewise, all except Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s statutory 
analysis that the term “disparag[ing] to . . . ‘persons’” was correctly 
read, as a matter of statutory interpretation, to authorize the 
agency to refuse registration to trademarks disparaging to racial 
and ethnic groups.91 
Parsing the different opinions in Matal v. Tam, three other 
basic areas of common ground emerge with respect to free speech. 
The Justices agreed, in sum, that: first, Section 2(a)’s 
disparagement clause is a viewpoint-based restriction on speech;92 
second, viewpoint-based government burdens on speech 
presumptively violate the First Amendment;93 and third, Section 
2(a) cannot be saved by classifying registered trademarks as 
government speech—which is not subject to viewpoint 
discrimination restrictions—since trademarks are clearly 
private.94 
B. Section 2(a) is a Viewpoint-Based Restriction on Speech 
All of the Justices agreed, as noted, that the provision of 
Section 2(a), which allowed the government to refuse registration 
of a trademark that “disparages” particular persons or groups, 
 
 
89. See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); see also id. at 1765 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90. See id. at 1751–55 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (laying out the basic 
framework of trademark law and the sequence of events in the case). 
91. See id. at 1755–57 (rejecting the argument by Tam that the term 
“persons” in Section 2(a) means only “natural and juristic” persons and does 
not extend to racial or ethnic groups). Justice Thomas did not reach this issue 
on the grounds that it was not preserved for appeal. See supra note 85. 
92. See infra Section II.B. 
93. See infra Section II.C. 
94. See infra Section II.D. 
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constitutes viewpoint discrimination—a government restriction 
that seeks to suppress speech because of its message.95 
The government had argued that the statute did not 
discriminate based on viewpoint because it treated all 
“disparaging” trademarks equally—that is, it applied “equally to 
marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and 
socialists.”96 The Court rightfully rejected this.97 As Justice Alito 
observed, “[g]iving offense is a viewpoint.”98 Indeed, the agency’s 
record of unequal implementation of Section 2(a) provides ample 
proof of this.99 
In this case, for example, the agency refused to register “The 
Slants” because the agency found the mark “disparaging” to 
persons of Asian descent.100 Yet the agency had granted trademark 
registration to marks laudatory of the cultural qualities of Asians, 
including such marks as “Asian Efficiency” and “Celebrasians.”101 
In the same vein, the agency rejected registration for the trademark 
“Stop the Islamisation of America” while allowing registration for 
the culturally positive trademarks “Think Islam” and “New Islam 
Cool.”102 It has likewise denied registration to the derogatory 
trademark “Heeb” but allowed registration for “Jewishstar.”103 
Allowing trademarks that praise a group, but not those that 
disparage the same group, clearly constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination. A compelling example was provided by Justice 
Kennedy’s observation that, under the government’s logic, “a law 
would be viewpoint neutral even if it provided that public officials 
could be praised but not condemned.”104 Such provisions strike at 





95. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
96. Id.; see also id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To prohibit all sides 
from criticizing their opponents makes a law more viewpoint based, not less 
so.”). 
97. See id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
98. Id. at 1763. 
99. See id. at 1756–57 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
100. Id. at 1754. 
101. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
102. Id. at 1336–37. 
103. Id. 
104. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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C. Viewpoint-Based Restrictions on Speech Violate the First 
Amendment 
All of the Justices agreed, as well, that viewpoint 
discrimination is a particularly pernicious type of government 
regulation of speech that is presumptively unconstitutional under 
the Free Speech Clause.105 The opinions of both Justice Alito and 
Justice Kennedy are on unshakable constitutional ground in these 
conclusions.106 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when 
the government targets not subject matter, but the “particular 
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant.”107 
Justice Alito’s opinion is replete with emphatic statements to 
this effect.108 It is, he says, a “bedrock First Amendment principle” 
that speech “may not be banned on the ground that it expresses 
ideas that offend.”109 The Supreme Court, he notes, has said “time 
and again that ‘the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.’”110 Likewise, the “First Amendment forbids the 
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints 
or ideas at the expense of others.”111 
The plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy makes the same point 
in terms that are only slightly more qualified.112 With narrow 
exceptions, he notes, it is a “fundamental principle” of the First 
Amendment that “the government may not punish or suppress 
speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech 
conveys.”113 Viewpoint-based discrimination is “a form of speech 
 
105. Id. 
106. See id. at 1763, 1766 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
107. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995). 
108. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751, 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at 
1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
109. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
110. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (quoting Street v. New York, 
394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
111. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (quoting Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. 
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993)). 
112. See id. at 1765–66 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
113. Id. at 1765 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
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suppression so potent that it must be subject to rigorous 
constitutional scrutiny.”114 A law that is found to discriminate 
based on viewpoint is an “egregious” form of content discrimination 
that is “presumptively unconstitutional.”115 
The Justices agreed, as well, that it is of no constitutional 
significance that, under Section 2(a), registration is denied not 
because the government disapproves of the message expressed by 
the trademark, but because other citizens are offended.116 As 
Justice Kennedy emphasized, “[t]he Government may not insulate 
a law from charges of viewpoint discrimination by tying censorship 
to the reaction of the speaker’s audience.”117 Rather, the 
government engages in unlawful suppression of speech when it 
allows the opposition of other citizens to be used as a justification 
for banning or burdening speech. The government could not, for 
example, deny a permit for a parade by unpopular speakers on the 
ground that the parade will create a safety hazard by drawing 
crowds hostile to the speakers’ message.118 The Court’s precedents, 
in Justice Kennedy’s words, have “long prohibited the government 
from justifying a First Amendment burden by pointing to the 
offensiveness of the speech to be suppressed.”119 
That the Justices would agree on these points is scarcely 
surprising, given that viewpoint-based government restrictions on 
speech go to the heart of the First Amendment’s basic purpose. It 
is a constitutional fundamental that the First Amendment “was 




U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995)). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015)). 
116. Id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that the 
government may not prohibit “the public expression of ideas . . . merely 
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers” (quoting 
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
117. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 1767 (“[A] speech 
burden based on audience reactions is simply government hostility and 
intervention in a different guise.”). 
118. See, e.g., Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 
134–35 (1992) (finding parade regulations that conditioned permit fees on 
anticipated crowds a content-based restriction on speech: “Speech cannot be 
financially burdened, any more than it can be punished or banned, simply 
because it might offend a hostile mob.”). 
119. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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debate.120 That guarantee is gravely threatened whenever the 
government is allowed to censor or discourage the expression of 
particular viewpoints in that debate.121 
D. Trademarks are Private Speech, Not Government Speech 
Finally, all of the Justices also agreed that the key 
circumstance in which viewpoint discrimination is permissible is 
not present here—where the speech at issue constitutes 
government or government-sponsored speech instead of speech by 
a private citizen.122 It is well-established that “[t]he Free Speech 
Clause . . . does not regulate government speech.”123 First 
Amendment law recognizes, sensibly, that when the government 
itself speaks, it may selectively choose its message without running 
afoul of the constitutional bar on viewpoint discrimination.124 
The government may, and should, engage in speech that 
expresses a specific viewpoint. Indeed, this is essential to 
governing. Justice Alito gave a simple example: When the 
government, in World War II, produced and distributed millions of 
posters to support the war effort by urging citizens to enlist, buy 
war bonds, and save scarce resources, “the First Amendment did 
not demand that the Government balance the message” by 
producing posters urging citizens not to enlist and not to support 
the war effort.125 More broadly, the government necessarily 
endorses a particular viewpoint whenever it launches a policy 
initiative, proposes a regulation, submits legislation to Congress, 
issues an Executive order, or takes any of the many actions involved 
in the process of governing.126 
 
 
120. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (quoting 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). 
121. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 829 (1995) (noting that government discrimination against speech based 
on the “opinion or perspective of the speaker” is a “more blatant” and 
“egregious form of content discrimination”); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230 (2015) (to same effect). 
122. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1765 (Kennedy., J. concurring); id. at 1769 
(Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1758, 1760 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
123. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion) (quoting Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009)). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1758. 
126. See, e.g., id. at 1757 (“When a government entity embarks on a course 
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At times, in a case that ostensibly implicates private speech, 
one side will argue that the message of a private speaker should 
instead be treated as government speech because the government 
has adopted or endorsed that message. The determinative 
constitutional question then becomes whether to classify the 
expression at issue as government speech or private speech. By 
labelling a particular mode of expression as government speech, the 
Supreme Court has at times been able to sidestep addressing the 
merits of a Free Speech challenge.127 But these “government 
speech” cases are challenging to summarize, and tend to present 
idiosyncratic fact patterns. 
It is established, for example, that the government may adopt 
or endorse private speech to express its own message.128 The 
government may also speak by “recruiting others to communicate a 
message on its behalf.”129 In such instances, the speech will be 
treated as the government’s own statement. The Supreme Court 
has emphasized, in this regard, that the government “is entitled to 
say what it wishes” when it uses private speakers to transmit 
specific information pertaining to a government program.130 
The Court has shown some inclination in recent years to 
expand its “government speech” doctrine,131 and the rationale has 
 
of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others.”); 
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 
(2015) (“[A]s a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to 
promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position.”). 
127. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005) 
(concluding that, in constitutional challenge to government-funded advertising 
for the beef industry, “the dispositive question is whether the generic 
advertising at issue is the Government’s own speech and therefore is exempt 
from First Amendment scrutiny”). 
128. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 
(2009) (holding that when the City accepted donated monuments to erect in a 
public park, it was engaged in government speech and did not create a public 
forum open to other private monuments). 
129. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing case 
law). 
130. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 
(1995) (describing the Court’s holding in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184– 
87 (1991), which upheld the constitutionality of a provision that banned groups 
receiving federal funding for a family planning program from discussing 
abortion with their clients in the program). 
131. Compare Johanns, 544 U.S. at 562 (treating as government speech a 
generic advertising campaign promoting the beef industry financed under a 
federal program), with United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409– 
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been increasingly invoked by litigants in free speech challenges.132 
At the same time, all voting Justices in Matal v. Tam recognized 
the danger of applying the Court’s “government speech” precedents 
too broadly.133 
The question here, in essence, was whether registering 
trademarks in an official federal registry gives such trademarks the 
imprimatur of government approval, so as to turn them into a type 
of “government speech.”134 The Justices unanimously answered 
this question “no.”135 Applying the “government speech” 
precedents in the trademark context, the Court concluded that 
merely registering a private trademark does not turn that mark 
into “government speech.”136 As Justice Alito emphasized, the 
government does not endorse the message of any given trademark 
by placing it on the federal trademark register.137 
This is clearly correct. Registration simply acts as notice to the 
public that the trademark has met certain legal requirements as a 
source-identifier for the trademark owner’s goods or services and is 
owned by a particular company. The USPTO, the government 
agency charged with the trademark registration process, has 
expressly stated that the issuance of a trademark registration “is 
not a government imprimatur.”138 
The “government speech” precedent most heavily relied upon 
by the government here was the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans,139 
 
17 (2001) (treating as private speech a generic advertising campaign promoting 
the mushroom industry financed under a similar government program). 
132. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
133. Id. at 1758 (“[W]e must exercise great caution before extending our 
government-speech precedents.”); id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing that the government-speech exception is “narrow, to prevent the 
government from claiming that every government program is exempt from the 
First Amendment”). 
134. Id. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
135. Id. at 1759; id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, 
J., concurring). 
136. Id. at 1758–60 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
137. See id. at 1758 (noting that the trademark examiner “does not inquire 
whether any viewpoint conveyed by a mark is consistent with Government 
policy”). 
138. In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1216, 1220 n.3 
(T.T.A.B. 1993); see also Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1759 (“The PTO has made it clear 
that registration does not constitute approval of a mark.”). 
139. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
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upholding a Texas law that allows the State broad discretion as to 
when to issue “specialty license plates” that include a private 
group’s message in addition to the usual contents of the license 
plate, such as the plate number and State.140 The law gave Texas 
officials broad power to grant or deny private petitions proposing 
specialty license plates, including the power to reject a petition if 
the proposed design “might be offensive to any member of the 
public.”141 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of a private group’s message, 
the Supreme Court held in Walker that the specialty license plates 
were government speech.142 The private designs accepted by the 
State were placed on “government-mandated, government- 
controlled, and government-issued” vehicle identification plates 
and were “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a 
government message.”143 Because the Court found that the case 
involved government speech, Texas could properly decide to 
endorse some groups’ messages and to decline to endorse other 
messages that could be “offensive.”144 
The Court in Matal v. Tam had little difficulty distinguishing 
the Walker precedent.145 Justice Alito found it “far-fetched” in the 
context of the federal trademark registration scheme to “suggest 
that the content of a registered mark is government speech.”146 If 
a registered trademark is government speech, he observed, one 
would be forced to conclude that the federal government is 
“babbling prodigiously and incoherently,” saying “many unseemly 
things,” expressing “contradictory views,” and “unashamedly 
 
140. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239, 2244–45 (2015) (regarding Texas’s rejection of a proposed license plate 
design that would have included the confederate flag and the words “Sons of 
Confederate Veterans” and providing other examples of approved specialty 
license plates including: the Florida Gators sports team’s logo and the 
statement “The Gator Nation,” and the Rotary International logo and the 
words, “SERVICE ABOVE SELF”). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 2246. 
143. Id. at 2250. 
144. See id. at 2246 (emphasizing that “as a general matter, when the 
government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or 
to take a position”). 
145. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017). 
146. Id. at 1759 (“None of our government speech cases even remotely 
supports the idea that registered trademarks are government speech.”). 
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endorsing a vast array of commercial products and services.”147 As 
Justice Alito bluntly summed up, “[t]rademarks are private, not 
government, speech.”148 
Looking to the federal trademark scheme, this was clearly the 
only defensible conclusion.149 When the government accepts Nike’s 
trademarked slogan for trademark registration, the government is 
obviously not trying to adopt that slogan and tell American citizens 
to “Just do it.”150 Instead, federal registration simply serves as 
nationwide notice to the public and competing businesses that 
Nike—a private company—has properly staked out that slogan as 
a mark for sales of its own commercial line of sports products.151 
In short, the Court recognized in Matal v. Tam that a 
trademark is private speech before it is registered, and the fact that 
it has been included in a government database does not change that 
conclusion.152 Under the government’s proposed rationale, Justice 
Alito emphasized, any copyrighted book or article would be stripped 
of constitutional free speech protections whenever its author took 
steps to protect his copyright by federally registering the work.153 
Moreover, there are a plethora of government registration 
schemes.154 Thus, to hold that a program for governmental 
 
147. Id. at 1758. 
148. Id. at 1760. 
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002). 
150. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1759 (posing the question, “if trademarks represent 
government speech, what does the Government have in mind when it advises 
Americans to ‘make.believe’ (Sony), ’Think different’ (Apple), ’Just do it’ 
(Nike), or ‘Have it your way’ (Burger King)? Was the Government warning 
about a coming disaster when it registered the mark ‘EndTime Ministries’?” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
151. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(noting that “the PTO routinely registers marks that no one can say the 
government endorses, [such as] RADICALLY FOLLOWING CHRIST IN 
MISSION TOGETHER, . . . THINK ISLAM, . . . GANJA UNIVERSITY, . . . 
CAPITALISM SUCKS DONKEY BALLS, . . . TAKE YO PANTIES OFF, . . . 
and MURDER 4 HIRE . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
152. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760 (“Trademarks are private, not government, 
speech.”). 
153. See id. at 1760 (“If federal registration makes a trademark 
government speech and thus eliminates all First Amendment protection, 
would the registration of the copyright for a book produce a similar 
transformation?”). 
154. See id. at 1761 (“Trademark registration is not the only government 
registration scheme. For example, the Federal Government registers 
copyrights and patents. State governments and their subdivisions register the 
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registration turns a private party’s speech into government speech 
would give the government, Justice Alito emphasized, sweeping 
powers to “silence or muffle the expression of disfavored 
viewpoints.”155 
While it may resonate emotionally to argue that the 
government should not have to accept offensive and racially 
derogatory trademarks and slogans for federal registration, the 
Court was correct in its conclusion that the government is not 
“speaking” or endorsing the messages expressed by offensive 
trademarks merely by accepting those trademarks for 
registration.156 
From the discussion above, it might seem that the Court was 
in broad agreement as to the constitutional free speech issue 
presented by Matal v. Tam, but the remainder of the opinions belie 
this impression. When it came to the final step of the free speech 
analysis—scrutinizing the reasons offered by the government to 
support the speech restriction—the Court lost their consensus.157 
III. AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE IN MATAL V. TAM 
Oddly, although all voting Justices found that Section 2(a)’s 
“disparagement” provision violated the Free Speech Clause, the 
Court could not agree on the proper constitutional analysis. While 
all Justices agreed that the law was a viewpoint-based restriction 
on private speech, the Justices could not reach agreement on 
another free speech issue: should the restriction on trademarks at 
issue here be analyzed as a government regulation of commercial 
speech? Or as a government burden on core political speech?158 
The answer to this question dictates how much deference the court 
will give to the governmental restriction on speech. 
The parties were in pointed disagreement as to the proper level 
 
title to real property and security interests; they issue driver’s licenses, motor 
vehicle registrations, and hunting, fishing, and boating licenses or permits.”). 
155. Id. at 1758. 
156. Id. at 1760 (“Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the 
mark into government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous 
extension of the government-speech doctrine.”). 
157. Id. at 1760–61, 1763, 1766. 
158. See id. at 1763–64 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion) (noting that “we must 
confront a dispute between the parties on the question whether trademarks 
are commercial speech and are thus subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in 
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.” (citation omitted)). 
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of scrutiny.159 The government took the position that “all 
trademarks are commercial speech,” arguing for a deferential 
standard of review.160 Conversely, Mr. Tam took the position that 
“many, if not all, trademarks have an expressive component,” 
arguing that stricter scrutiny of the government’s action was 
required.161 Matal v. Tam did not prove to be a useful vehicle for 
reaching a thoughtful resolution of this issue. 
Ultimately, four Justices concluded that “we need not resolve” 
this dispute, because the restriction at issue fails even under the 
more lenient standard of review for restrictions on commercial 
speech.162 But four Justices insisted, to the contrary, that even if 
trademarks are commercial speech, “the viewpoint based 
discrimination at issue here necessarily invokes heightened 
scrutiny.”163 In failing to reach any common ground on the 
appropriate degree of scrutiny, Matal v. Tam highlights a key area 
of dispute under the First Amendment: the extent to which 
commercial speech should enjoy free speech protection, and under 
what constitutional test such challenges should be decided. In this 
sense, Matal v. Tam lies at the cusp of a fundamental but difficult 
constitutional dispute that has been brewing for some time. While 
the contours of free speech law applied to traditional, “core” political 
speech are relatively well-settled, the Supreme Court’s more recent 
extension of free speech rights to commercial speech has created 
confusion over the proper scope of this more controversial doctrine, 





160. Id. at 1764. 
161. Id. 
162. Id.; see also id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that he is 
joining this aspect of Justice Alito’s opinion because “it correctly concludes that 
the disparagement clause . . . is unconstitutional even under the less stringent 
test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.” (citations omitted)). 
163. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Interestingly, while joining 
Justice Alito’s decision, Justice Thomas also noted his belief that “when the 
government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it 
conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question 
may be characterized as ‘commercial.’” See id. at 1768 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). Arguably, therefore, a majority of Justices agreed that “strict 
scrutiny” should be applied here. 
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A. The (Relatively) Clear Contours of Traditional Free Speech 
Doctrine 
The traditional arena of free speech cases—marches, public 
protests, political speeches, and the like—had led to a relatively 
clear and stable understanding of free speech principles among the 
courts, one that resonated with the courts’ inherent sense of the 
fundamental purposes of the Free Speech clause.164 
Consider, for example, the long-established rules on speech in 
a traditional public forum (a street, park, or the like). Where the 
government imposes content-based restrictions on speech in a 
traditional public forum—for example, if the government were to 
announce that a public park open for private displays generally will 
be closed to private religious displays—the courts will apply “strict 
scrutiny.”165 This means that the courts will uphold such a content- 
based restriction only if it is “necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest” and “narrowly drawn to achieve that end” (a notoriously 
difficult standard to meet).166 Such actions are closely reviewed 
because the government is prohibited from censoring particular 
topics for public debate. 
If the government goes further and bars speech based on 
viewpoint—for example, if the government ban on displays in the 
private park, posited above, did not extend to all religious displays, 
but only to displays promoting atheism—the review is further 
heightened. In the example above, a sign condemning atheists 
would be permitted, but a sign advocating for atheism would not. 
This constitutes viewpoint discrimination. When the government 
imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on private speech, it is 
treated as an “egregious” form of content-based regulation of 
 
 
164. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (noting that public- 
issue picketing is “an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most 
pristine and classic form” and “has always rested on the highest rung of the 
hierarchy of First Amendment values” (citations omitted)). 
165. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 761 (1995) (emphasizing that “strict standards” apply when the 
government seeks to regulate expressive content in a traditional public forum). 
166. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981); see also, e.g., Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761 (noting similarly that the 
government may regulate expressive content in a traditional public forum 
“only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a 
compelling state interest”). 
 2018] FREE SPEECH AND TRADEMARK LAW 149 
 
speech, and is reviewed even more strictly.167 Government 
restrictions based on the viewpoint expressed by a private speaker 
are presumptively unconstitutional.168 
On the other hand, even in a traditional public forum such as 
a park, the government is well within its rights to enact reasonable 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.169 Such rules 
command deference, and will be upheld so long as they are truly 
“content-neutral,” are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest,” and “leave open ample alternative 
channels for communication of the information.”170 
In these traditional free speech cases, the courts had also 
developed an orderly set of free speech principles for assessing 
speech-related regulations in forums that were not traditionally 
used for speech, but had been set aside by the government for that 
purpose (“limited public forums”) and on government property more 
generally (“nonpublic forums”).171 This relatively stable set of 
traditional free speech rules was unsettled by a legal movement 
that decisively emerged around 1980, the year in which the 
Supreme Court first established a general free speech test 
applicable to attempts to limit commercial speech, the Central 
Hudson Gas test.172 The introduction of free speech protections for 
commercial speech threw a wrench in the works of this relatively 







167. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 829 (1995) (“Viewpoint discrimination is . . . an egregious form of content 
discrimination.”). 
168. See, e.g., id. at 829 (“The government must abstain from regulating 
speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of 
the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”). 
169. See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. at 761 
(noting that the government may impose reasonable, content-neutral, time, 
place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public forum). 
170. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
171. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45–46 (1983) (describing the rules applicable to different types of forums). 
172. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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B. The Slow Development of Commercial Free Speech Rights 
For many years, commercial speech was considered to lie 
“outside the ambit of the First Amendment,”173 and thus not 
entitled to any constitutional protection under the Free Speech 
clause. It was not until the mid-1970’s that the Supreme Court held 
that the First Amendment protected the dissemination of truthful 
and non-misleading commercial messages about lawful products 
and services.174 And, as noted, it was not until 1980 that the 
Supreme Court established a specific constitutional doctrine for 
assessing the free speech rights for commercial speech.175 
In the Central Hudson Gas case,176 the Supreme Court 
articulated its “commercial speech” doctrine. The State of New 
York had sought to bar any promotional advertising by an electric 
utility, and the Supreme Court invalidated this bar on free speech 
grounds.177 Recognizing that there is a “‘commonsense’ distinction 
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs 
in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,” and 
other types of speech,178 the Court held that the Constitution 
protects commercial speech but “accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression.”179 The Court went on to lay out a four-part test for 
determining the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial 
speech that still governs this area of doctrine today.180 
 
 
173. Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 574–75 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
174. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti–History and 
Pre–History of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 747, 754–55 (1993); see 44 
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (describing the 
evolution of commercial speech doctrine). 
175. See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 558–59, 570. 
178. Id. at 562. 
179. Id. at 563. 
180. Id. at 566 (“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has 
developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, 
we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation 
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”). 
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The Central Hudson Gas formula,181 which has been applied 
in cases too numerous to list, has come to be known as the 
“intermediate scrutiny” test for commercial speech. In applying 
“intermediate scrutiny,” the courts emphasize that while 
commercial speech enjoys certain constitutional protections, the 
leeway for government regulation remains greater in the areas of 
commercial speech than for other forms of expression.182 For 
example, content-based limitations on commercial speech, which 
would be subject to “strict scrutiny” review in other contexts,183 
may be often permissible when the government is regulating 
commercial speech. 
A government regulation applicable to commercial speech 
could properly, for example, explicitly target only advertising that 
markets banking services (a content-based limitation of commercial 
speech) yet still pass muster under the First Amendment.184 By 
contrast, a government regulation that excluded from a traditional 
public forum any political speech discussing banking would quickly 
invoke strict scrutiny.185 
The development of commercial speech doctrine threw a 
wrench in the works, to begin with, because the proponents of the 
right depart quite significantly from what the courts have thought 
of as the “core” of free speech. The traditional free speech plaintiff 





182. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) 
(noting that the Court has “afforded commercial speech a limited measure of 
protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First 
Amendment values, while allowing modes of regulation that might be 
impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.”). 
183. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 
(2000) (noting that a content-based speech restriction “can stand only if it 
satisfies strict scrutiny”). 
184. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (noting 
that “a State may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but not 
in others, because the risk of fraud . . . is in its view greater there.” (citation 
omitted)). 
185. See, e.g., Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456 (noting that the Court has “afforded 
commercial speech a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its 
subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing 
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of 
noncommercial expression.”). 
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Even more important, if free speech rights are extended to 
encompass commercial speech, there are many regulatory schemes 
that touch on speech but have never been thought of as raising any 
First Amendment issues that must now be considered. Recognizing 
free speech protections for “commercial” speech runs head on into 
the power of Congress to “regulate commerce,” a power that 
supports the enactment of numerous federal regulatory schemes.186 
Many of these directly or indirectly regulate speech activities. 
The challenge is how to recognize appropriate speech rights in 
the commercial arena without compromising the federal 
government’s ability to regulate commerce and state governments’ 
ability to protect public health, safety and welfare. Read too 
broadly, commercial free speech rights will hamper the 
government’s ability to engage in regulation in the public interest 
and encourage legal challenges by regulated industries whenever a 
regulatory regime threatens to affect speech activities (as is 
virtually always the case, given the breadth with which “speech” is 
defined). 
It is also notoriously difficult to distinguish “commercial 
speech” from non-commercial speech. The relatively narrow 
definition used by the Supreme Court in some of its initial cases 
defined commercial speech cases as speech “that proposes a 
commercial transaction.”187 In the Central Hudson Gas case, 
however, the Court more broadly referred to commercial speech as 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”188 Moreover, even within the narrower category 
of speech “proposing a commercial transaction,” such speech often 
includes both commercial and expressive components.189 How 
should the courts, for example, evaluate a government ban on the 
distribution of pamphlets by commercial companies that operates 
to bar the distribution of pamphlets that both advertise a particular 
 
186. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. 
187. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 
421 (1993) (explaining that the Court’s early commercial speech cases stand 
for the proposition that “even speech that does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction is protected by the First Amendment” (citations 
omitted)); see also, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
188. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 561 (1980). 
189. Id. at 561–62. 
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company’s prophylactics and inform the public of the hazards of 
sexually-transmitted disease? Should this be treated as a 
restriction on commercial speech or on core political speech? 
The debate has tended to devolve into extended debates—as 
here—on which standard of “scrutiny” should be applied, and which 
type of speech is at issue, commercial speech or “core” speech. 
While this may seem technical, the level of scrutiny can be 
determinative in a First Amendment challenge. There is a common 
saying—“strict in theory, fatal in fact”—that many argue is an apt 
description of the “strict scrutiny” standard.190 
Few government actions reviewed under “strict scrutiny” can 
provide a justification sufficient to support the restriction on 
speech. Conversely, the “intermediate scrutiny” test gives far more 
respect to and leeway for government action in a particular 
regulatory sphere. In simple terms, while strict scrutiny looks with 
suspicion on the government’s actions, intermediate scrutiny gives 
the government the benefit of the doubt. Which standard of 
scrutiny to apply to commercial speech in different settings is a 
matter of hot debate in the Supreme Court’s recent decisions.191 
C. Symptoms of the Commercial Speech Debate in Matal v. Tam 
This simmering debate over commercial speech explains the 
doctrinal disputes that led the Court in Matal v. Tam to splinter 
over the final step that was needed to reach a unanimous rationale 
(and not simply a unanimous judgment), on the free speech issue 
presented192—the proper level of scrutiny here. 
When Justice Alito turned to the issue, he framed the “debate” 
between the parties as “whether trademarks are commercial 




190. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) 
(making reference to  the  notion  that  “strict scrutiny  is  ‘strict in theory, 
but fatal in fact’” while seeking to dispel it). 
191. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (dispute 
between majority and dissent over whether strict scrutiny, intermediate 
scrutiny, or rational basis scrutiny applies in free speech challenge to state law 
barring the disclosure of physician’s drug prescribing data for “marketing” 
purposes). 
192. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763–64 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality 
opinion). 
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Central Hudson Gas.193 Without delving into the merits of the 
parties’ arguments, he simply noted that “we need not resolve this 
debate” because the disparagement clause “cannot withstand even 
Central Hudson review.”194 Justice Alito was joined in this 
conclusion by three other Justices (Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Breyer, and Justice Thomas).195 
Justice Kennedy fundamentally disagreed that the legal issue 
was open.196 Instead, he insisted, the Court has already decided 
this very issue.197 According to Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, the Supreme Court held two 
years ago, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., that “commercial speech 
is no exception” to the principle that the First Amendment “requires 
heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates a regulation 
of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”198 
Meanwhile, in the third opinion in Matal v. Tam, Justice Thomas 
joined that part of Justice Alito’s opinion, concluding that the 
Court “need not resolve the debate,” and expressed separately his   
agreement  with   Justice   Kennedy  on  the  merits.199 He 
“continue[d]” to adhere to his view that that strict scrutiny is 
required “when[ever] the government seeks to restrict truthful 
speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys,” whether nor not 
the speech could be seen as “commercial.”200 (It is possible that 
Justice Thomas simply did not agree with that part of Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion that insisted that this issue had already been 
resolved by the Supreme Court’s Sorrell case.) 
And as for the Sorrell201 case? That case can easily be read for 
both propositions, since it is highly equivocal on whether or not it 
resolved the issue of viewpoint discrimination directed at 
 
 
193. Id. at 1763. If his statement that “we need not resolve” this dispute 
was not noncommittal enough, Justice Alito also expressly emphasizes that his 
opinion “leave[s] open the question whether Central Hudson provides the 
appropriate test for deciding free speech challenges to provisions of the 
Lanham Act.” Id. at 1764 n.17. 
194. Id. at 1764. 
195. Id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
196. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). 
199. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
200. Id. 
201. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552. 
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commercial speech.202 In Sorrell, the Supreme Court considered a 
complex state law directed to “data mining” in the pharmaceutical 
industry that barred pharmacies from selling information about 
physicians’ patterns of prescribing drugs, without their consent, for 
marketing purposes.203 While the law barred data sharing with 
for-profit drug companies, it included an exception that allowed 
data sharing with private and academic researchers.204 
The Court held that that law on its face was both “content- 
based” (directed at marketing) and “speaker-based” (directed at 
drug companies).205 It also held that, “in practice,” the law was 
viewpoint-based, since the drug companies barred from getting the 
information were all seeking it in order to convince the targeted 
doctors to buy their branded drugs.206 
In one part of the Sorrell opinion, the Court did state, as Justice 
Kennedy invokes, that because the law is “designed to impose a 
specific, content-based burden on protected expression,” it “follows 
that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.”207 In the same 
discussion, the Court also said that “[t]he First Amendment 
requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates ‘a 
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys,’”208 and that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”209 The 
Court concluded this discussion by stating that the Vermont law at 
issue “imposes a speaker- and content-based burden on protected 
expression, and that circumstance is sufficient to justify application 
of heightened scrutiny.”210 
Confusingly, however, this discussion was immediately 
followed by the Court’s statement in Sorrell that there was “no need 
 
202. See id. at 571. 
203. Id. at 558–59. 
204. Id. at 559–60. 
205. Id. at 563–64. 
206. Id. at 578–79. By contrast, the law did not bar public interest groups 
who wish to contradict the drug companies’ messages from getting the 
information. See id. at 564 (noting that it “appears that Vermont could supply 
academic organizations with prescriber-identifying information to use in 
countering the messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in 
promoting the prescription of generic drugs.”). 
207. Id. at 565. 
208. Id. at 566 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1981)). 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 571. 
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to determine” whether the speech affected by the law is commercial, 
since the “outcome is the same” whether strict or intermediate 
scrutiny is applied.211 The Court went on to apply the commercial 
speech test under Central Hudson Gas, before concluding that the 
law failed intermediate scrutiny.212 
In addition, while the Court mentioned that the law was “in 
practice” viewpoint-based, its express holdings appear to be limited 
to the aspects of the law that were content- and speaker-based.213 
Thus, this case has been interpreted as leaving open the viewpoint- 
discrimination issue for which Justice Kennedy cited it.214 While  
it is not surprising that the Justices could not agree on the 
significance of the Sorrell decision, it is notable that Justice Alito’s 
decision does not even respond to Justice Kennedy’s point.215 
In short, because the Justices in Matal v. Tam were unable to 
agree on the proper treatment of commercial speech in this 
context—or to settle on a single standard of scrutiny—the case 
produced no single opinion for the Court laying out a clear 
constitutional rationale.216 
IV. THE MOST COHERENT APPROACH TO FREE SPEECH IN THIS SETTING 
This legal background, described above, explains why a case 
involving a little-known band and an obscure provision of 
trademark law should generate so much interest among amici from 
the Chamber of Commerce, to Pro-Football, to the ACLU. Yet, 
ultimately, the Supreme Court did not advance the ongoing debate 
over commercial speech in any meaningful way in its decision in 
 
211. Id. (noting that the “State argues that a different analysis applies here 
because, assuming § 4631(d) burdens speech at all, it at most burdens only 
commercial speech. As in previous cases, however, the outcome is the same 
whether a special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial 
scrutiny is applied.”). 
212. Id. at 572–79. 
213. See id. at 588 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority 
opinion to say “that we must give content-based restrictions that burden 
speech ‘heightened’ scrutiny” and that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception”). 
214. See, e.g., Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Moore, J., writing specially) (citing Sorrell in noting that “[a]lthough the 
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether strict scrutiny attaches to 
restrictions on commercial speech that are viewpoint discriminatory, there is 
reason to believe it is an issue worth considering.”). 
215. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
216. See id. 
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Matal v. Tam.217 
Stepping back to consider the different opinions in the Matal v. 
Tam case from a bird’s-eye view, however, it is puzzling as to why 
all of the Justices could not agree on a single opinion for the Court 
as a whole. They all agreed on the outcome. They agreed as well 
on what might seem to an outsider as the central free speech 
principle in this case (viewpoint discrimination by the government 
is not allowed by the free speech clause). Why the ongoing 
disagreements about commercial speech doctrine would have 
prevented a full Court opinion in this particular case is unclear. 
The opinions—issued on one of the last days of the Term—seem 
cursory. 
This raises a legitimate question: Was the Supreme Court so 
focused on its ongoing dispute about commercial speech rights that 
it missed the opportunity to reach common ground on a more basic, 
but fundamental, aspect of First Amendment law? Or was it, 
perhaps, waiting for Justice Gorsuch to join the debate in order to 
issue a fuller opinion on the commercial speech issue? 
Whatever the reason, this was arguably a missed opportunity. 
The Court rightly rejected the Federal Circuit’s proposed 
constitutional framework. However, this case might well have 
presented an opportunity to bring the Court together in a 
meaningful and helpful way on the narrow viewpoint- 
discrimination question posed in Matal v. Tam, a point explored 
further below. 
A. Rejecting the “Expressive Character” Test was a Valuable 
Contribution 
The Court was right, first of all, to reject the proposed 
framework articulated by the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision.218 
If nothing else, the Matal v. Tam decision is valuable in that it 
displaces a free speech theory in the commercial speech context that 
could have engendered yet more confusion.219 
The Federal Circuit en banc held that even within a single 
regulatory scheme, a government regulation that targets the 
“expressive component” of commercial speech should be judged 
 
217. See id. at 1764, 1767 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
218. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
219. Id. at 1338. 
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strictly, while one that regulates the “commercial component” of the 
same speech should get more deference.220 Noting that trademarks 
have both commercial and expressive aspects, the Federal Circuit 
proposed that the standard of scrutiny in a given case should be 
based, not on the character of the speech generally, but on “which 
aspect of the speech is targeted by the measure being reviewed.”221 
Because section 2(a)’s disparagement clause is “entirely directed to 
the expressive component of the speech,” the court held, strict 
scrutiny should apply.222 
The Federal Circuit’s theory attempts to bring clarity to 
commercial speech doctrine by proposing that the courts start with 
the details of the regulation at issue, rather than by characterizing 
the type of speech being regulated.223 It is true that the Central 
Hudson Gas test224 is a blunt instrument that is not sufficiently 
nuanced for considering the wide variety of free speech issues that 
can arise in the regulatory context. At the same time, the 
“expressive character” test offered by the Federal Circuit in its en 
banc decision in In re Tam225 would have been a dangerous 
precedent. 
To begin with, the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that section 2(a) 
“targets speech that is of ‘public concern’”226 appears to have been 
heavily influenced by its factual finding that Simon Tam “named 
his band THE SLANTS to make a statement about racial and 
cultural issues in this country.”227 This factual finding should not 
play any decisive role in dictating the level of constitutional 
scrutiny. 
Simply as a factual matter, at times in the litigation, Mr. Tam 
 
220. Id.; see also id. (“The disparagement provision must be assessed under 
First Amendment standards applicable to what it targets, which is not the 
commercial-speech function of the mark.”). 
221. Id. at 1339. 
222.  Id. at 1338, 1339; see also id. (noting that the court is not addressing 
“a government regulation aimed at the commercial component of speech”); id. 
(“[s]trict scrutiny must apply to a government regulation that is directed at the 
expressive component of speech.”). 
223. Id. at 1339. 
224. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980). 
225. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1338. 
226. Id. at 1339. 
227. Id. at 1327–28; see, e.g., id. at 1338 (“With his band name, Mr. Tam 
makes a statement about racial and ethnic identity.”). 
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denied any political motivation in picking “The Slants” as a name 
(and indeed, denied that it was a racial slur at all), whether 
genuinely or for strategic reasons.228 But even if he had always 
insisted that he was politically motivated, the level of constitutional 
protection for speech cannot possibly turn on how a speaker chooses 
to characterize his own speech. Under this rationale, fast food 
restaurants could gain enhanced free speech protections simply by 
announcing that they are seeking to send a “political message” by 
urging consumers to buy their new bacon cheeseburgers.229 The 
emphasis on Tam’s “political message” throughout this litigation is 
an appealing detail for free speech purposes but ultimately proves 
to be a red herring. 
More fundamentally, the concept that regulations can be neatly 
divided into two categories, those that target either a “commercial 
component” or an “expressive component” of commercial speech, is 
flawed. Most advertising, by its nature, is both highly expressive 
and commercially motivated. The same is true of trademarks. As 
Justice Alito emphasized in Matal v. Tam, “the line between 
commercial and non-commercial speech is not always clear.”230 
Justice Kennedy observed, in the same vein, that trademarks 
“make up part of the expression of everyday life, as with the names 
of entertainment groups, broadcast networks, designer clothing, 
newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and so on.”231 It is 
illusory to think that it is possible to separate the “expressive” from 
the “commercial” aspects of the speech in the manner that the 
Federal Circuit’s analysis suggests.232 
 
228. In the administrative proceeding before the USPTO, Mr. Tam denied 
any intent to express a political view, and took the position that “the mark does 
not refer to people of Asian descent.” Tam Panel Decision, 785 F.3d 567, 570 
(Fed. Cir. 2015). 
229. It is also notable that the outcome here would have been the same had 
Tam denied that the mark was intended to be disparaging rather than 
embraced the name as a racial slur, since the Court had ample evidence in the 
record that the trademark was seen as disparaging by other Asian-Americans, 
which is the relevant test under this particular statutory provision. See, e.g., 
Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1332 (noting that the USPTO disqualified 
“The Slants” mark because it “found that the mark is disparaging to a 
substantial component of people of Asian descent”). 
230. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Alito, J.) (plurality 
opinion). 
231. Id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
232. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1339. 
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As important, this expressive aspect of trademark is at the 
heart of the trademark registration review in every instance, not 
simply when considering section 2(a)’s “disparagement” clause. A 
trademark cannot be registered at all unless it is sufficiently 
“distinctive,” that is, capable of “distinguishing” the goods or 
services from those offered by others in the same market.233 This 
requires that the agency look closely, in each case, at the message 
a trademark is expressing. To place a particular mark on the so- 
called “spectrum of distinctiveness,” as the agency does every day, 
requires one to consider whether the expressive aspects of this 
mark, as used for this product, are sufficiently distinctive to evoke 
the product’s source in the eye of the consumer simply from seeing 
the mark (for example, consider the expressive quality of Tiffany 
blue packaging).234 
Thus, while a generic term like “Milk” would clearly not be 
sufficiently distinctive to be acceptable as a trademark for dairy 
products,235 a trademark like “Smooth and Creamy” might well be. 
In deciding whether to grant federal registration for the latter 
mark, the agency would necessarily have to look to and assess the 
mark’s “expressive” capacity as a trademark for dairy products. 
Outside of the trademark area, many, many regulatory 
schemes similarly, directly or obliquely touch on the “expressive 
component” of particular speech as it may be relevant for the 
purpose of that particular regulatory scheme, from the federal 
securities laws to food and drug laws. As the Supreme Court has 
emphasized, “[b]y definition commercial speech is linked 
inextricably to commercial activity . . . .”236 Laws regulating 
 
233. See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2012) (“No trademark by which the 
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be 
refused registration” except on specified and limited grounds.). 
234. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) 
(explaining that trademarks “are often classified in categories of generally 
increasing distinctiveness; following the classic formulation set out by Judge 
Friendly, they may be (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; 
or (5) fanciful.”); see also, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 
159, 163 (1995) (“[O]ver time, customers may come to treat a particular color 
on a product . . . as signifying a brand. And, if so, that color would have come 
to identify and distinguish the goods.”). 
235. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (trademarks will not be registered if they are 
“merely descriptive” of the products). 
236. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979) (internal quotations 
omitted) (emphasizing that “the State does not lose its power to regulate 
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commercial activity routinely require that advertising, labelling, 
disclosures, or other speech-related commercial activities either 
include or omit particular information in order to protect the 
consumer. Because such provisions are an essential and proper 
part of regulating commerce, the Supreme Court has expressly held 
that for commercial speech, the First Amendment allows “modes of 
regulation . . . that might be impermissible in the realm of 
noncommercial expression.”237 
In short, the proposed test offered by the Federal Circuit— that 
whenever a regulation is focused on the “expressive component” of 
commercial speech, the court should apply strict scrutiny238—is 
seriously overbroad. The problem here was not that the agency 
considered the “expressive character” of Mr. Tam’s mark; the 
agency routinely and properly considers the messages expressed by 
trademarks in making registration determinations. Rather, the 
problem is that section 2(a)’s “disparagement” provision allows the 
government to reject otherwise qualifying trademarks based on 
their viewpoint.239 It is this flaw that should and must be the focus 
of any free speech test in this context. 
B. The Free Speech Analysis That Should Have Worked for the 
Full Court 
Focusing on the issue of viewpoint discrimination, there is a 
great deal of common ground among the opinions in Matal v. Tam, 
even though there is no single opinion for the Court as a whole.240 
This suggests another path that could, potentially, have unified the 
Supreme Court. 
The dispute between the two plurality opinions—one authored 
by Justice Alito and one by Justice Kennedy—reflects, as noted, an 
ongoing dispute within the Supreme Court over the proper 
 
 
commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a 
component of that activity” (internal quotations omitted)). 
237. See, e.g., id. at 11 n.9 (internal citation omitted) (emphasizing that 
when dealing with restrictions on commercial speech, we “frame our decisions 
narrowly” (internal citation omitted)). 
238. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
239. Id. at 1339. 
240. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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application of its commercial speech cases.241 This is a debate that 
threads through many recent Supreme Court decisions. The 
Justices could not reach an agreement because they were narrowly 
focused on a dispute over “intermediate scrutiny” versus “strict 
scrutiny,” an important and unsettled issue in First Amendment 
law generally in the commercial speech context. 
Reaching agreement on the proper level of scrutiny is 
extremely difficult because Justices are, understandably, wary in 
making any statement about the impact that the particular 
wording could have in the many different commercial and political 
environments in which free speech issues are now raised. 
In this case, however, the narrow focus in both plurality 
opinions on the dispute over the proper level of scrutiny obscured 
the important areas of common ground in Matal v. Tam.242 As a 
result, the decision produced no new or useful statement about 
First Amendment law. 
One wonders whether the Court could have reached consensus 
by stepping back from the “standard of scrutiny” debate and, 
instead, embracing the chance to agree on an important common 
principle that all shared. In particular, the Court would have been 
on sound constitutional ground in holding—flatly but narrowly— 
that in those rare cases in which a government rule is, by its terms, 
a clear and explicit “viewpoint-based” restriction on the content of 
private speech, the statute is unconstitutional on its face. 
Instead, Justice Alito noted that the Federal Circuit Court 
reasoned that “even if” the commercial speech “intermediate 
scrutiny” test applied, section 2(a) would fail, while Justice 
Kennedy insisted that “strict scrutiny” must apply.243 Justice 
Thomas agreed with both Justice Alito and Justice Kennedy that 
“strict scrutiny” must apply and that the law failed even the 
“intermediate scrutiny” test.244 This was a missed opportunity to 
come together on a basic constitutional principle that is important, 
non-controversial, and unrelated to the proper level of scrutiny. 
Indeed, the voting Justices all recognized that the level of 
scrutiny is irrelevant here because section 2(a) fails constitutional 
 
241. Id. at 1765, 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
242. Id. at 1765; id. at 1763–64 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). 
243. Id. at 1754 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
244. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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scrutiny under any test.245 But that insight was not embodied into 
a clear statement of law joined by the Court as a whole. Instead, 
the opinions devolved into another variation of the ongoing debate 
about standards of scrutiny. But the truth here—as evidenced by 
the unanimous outcome—that Section 2(a)’s “disparagement” 
provision was patently unconstitutional on its face. Why not 
declare as much? 
While flat rules are rarely appropriate, a flat rule prohibiting 
the government from engaging in clear and explicit viewpoint- 
based discrimination against private speech is sustainable here 
because there is no valid ground on which the government can 
censor particular private viewpoints. To provide a valid basis for 
suppressing speech, the government’s reason must be “viewpoint- 
neutral.”246 Where a law censors a particular private viewpoint, as 
a logical matter, it cannot be justified without explaining why the 
government believes that viewpoint should be censored. 
The proposed holding here would be narrow. Rules that 
restrict speech that incites violence or poses an immediate danger 
to public safety or welfare (such as yelling “fire” in a crowded 
theater) are already excluded from free speech protections.247 First 
Amendment doctrine has also eliminated from free speech 
challenges certain valid regulatory restrictions that might arguably 
be seen as “viewpoint-based,” such as those prohibiting deceptive or 
misleading speech. Such speech enjoys no free speech rights and 
may be freely banned or regulated by the government without 
implicating First Amendment concerns.248 Only truthful, non- 
misleading commercial speech gets protection under the Free 
 
245. Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 1763 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
246. Cf. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) 
(explaining  that  “content-neutral”  speech  regulations   are   “those   that 
are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
247. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340–41 (1974) 
(defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First 
Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity is not 
protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571–72 (1942) (“fighting words” are not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
248. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 
(1989) (“For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at 
least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” (citation omitted)). 
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Speech clause. 
Whether a particular government rule is properly understood 
to be an explicit viewpoint-based restriction on otherwise lawful 
private speech may, of course, require statutory interpretation.249 
But once a rule is properly characterized as such, which should be 
a very narrow category of rules, any rationale offered by the 
government cannot possibly be viewpoint-neutral, since it will by 
definition argue that private expression of the particular viewpoint 
poses alleged public hazards. 
Consider, for example, a traffic rule that generally allowed 
private citizens to display bumper stickers on their cars, but barred 
those bumper stickers that advocate for abortion rights. Such a rule 
would be patently unconstitutional. Such a law could not, for 
example, be constitutionally validated by government concerns that 
abortion-rights messages will distract or arouse anger in other 
motorists and thereby cause a traffic hazard. Banning a message 
because it is offensive to others is simply another form of 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.250 Surely, the 
Court would not have to agree on the proper level of scrutiny to 
declare such a law flatly unconstitutional. 
The same principle holds true in the commercial speech 
context. Consider a government regulation regulating advertising 
by lawyers that generally allowed truthful, non-misleading ads, but 
prohibited lawyer ads that criticize judges. A regulation that 
permits lawyers to publish ads that praise judges, but not ads that 
criticize judges, would be an explicitly viewpoint-based restriction. 
Is there any valid government rationale that could justify such a 
law?251 
 
249. See, e.g., Matal, 137 S. Ct. 1744. 
250. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (noting that 
otherwise lawful speech “cannot be restricted simply because it is upsetting or 
arouses contempt”); Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 
(1992) (“Listeners’ reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for 
regulation.” (citation omitted)); cf. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1336 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“The legal significance of viewpoint discrimination is the same 
whether the government disapproves of the message or claims that some part 
of the populace will disapprove of the message.”). 
251. By contrast, a regulation that applied only to advertising by lawyers 
—a speaker-based and perhaps content-based regulation—could legitimately 
be adopted as part of a comprehensive scheme regulating the legal profession, 
since this restriction only makes sense in the context of the particular 
regulatory scheme. 
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The Matal v. Tam case itself provides a prime example of the 
government’s near-impossible task of articulating a valid 
government interest to support a restriction on speech that is, on 
its face, viewpoint-based.252 In the Supreme Court, the 
government advanced two interests in support of Section 2(a)’s 
disparagement clause: its interest in rejecting trademarks that 
contain “demeaning messages”; and its interest in ensuring the 
“orderly flow of commerce.”253 As it turns out, however, both were 
simply thinly-veiled versions of the government’s view that 
trademarks like “The Slants” are just too offensive to qualify for the 
benefits of trademark registration.254 
Consider, for example, the government argument in the 
Supreme Court that it has a valid interest in preventing 
underrepresented groups from being “bombarded with demeaning 
messages in commercial advertising.”255 A variation of this 
rationale was also offered in the Federal Circuit, where the 
government advanced its interest in preventing the registration of 
“vile racial epithets and images” and in “dissociating itself from 
speech that it finds odious.”256 As Justice Alito observed, however, 
“no matter how the point is phrased, its unmistakable thrust is this: 
The Government has an interest in preventing speech expressing 
ideas that offend.”257 And this, he argued, “strikes at the heart of 
the First Amendment.”258 
Nor did the government’s alternative rationale—that allowing 
disparaging trademarks interrupts the “orderly flow of 
commerce”259—fare better. The government posited in its Supreme 
Court argument that commerce is “disrupted” by trademarks that 
 
252. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1761–63 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
253. Id. at 1764. 
254. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
255. Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
256. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d 1321, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(summarizing the government’s arguments in its briefs that it should be 
entitled to refuse registration to trademarks that include “the most vile racial 
epithets and images,” that incorporate “racial slurs,” that use “religious 
insults, ethnic caricatures, misogynistic images, or any other disparaging 
terms or logos,” or that generally use speech that the government “finds 
odious.” (citations omitted)). 
257. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
258. Id.; see also Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1336 (noting that the 
government is “underscoring its hostility to these messages”). 
259. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764. 
 166 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:122 
 
“involv[e] disparagement of race, gender, ethnicity, national origin, 
religion, sexual orientation, and similar demographic 
classification.”260 The government’s theory, apparently, was that 
when the content of commercial speech “may lead to political or 
social ‘volatility,’” such speech may properly be suppressed.261 Like 
the first rationale, however, this justification expressly relies on the 
alleged harms to commerce that flow from the disparaging message 
expressed by the specific marks that are banned. This is not a 
viewpoint-neutral rationale.262 
Had there been any neutral rationale the government could 
have found to support this rule, it certainly would have been offered 
here. Instead, the government focused its fire on trying to argue 
that the First Amendment did not apply at all.263 
In sum, rather than leaving the constitutional analysis at the 
final threshold, the Court as a whole should have been able to agree 
and clearly state, as a Court, that where, as here, there is an 
explicit, clear “viewpoint-based” burden on otherwise lawful private 
speech, the law is unconstitutional on its face and there is no need 
to debate the standard of scrutiny. The Court should have held that 
in those very rare circumstances in which the government has 
adopted an explicit, clear viewpoint-based restriction on private 
speech, that law is unconstitutional, period. 
CONCLUSION 
The Matal v. Tam case presented constitutional free speech 
issues that were, at one level, very easy.264 By empowering the 
federal government to refuse registration to trademarks it found 
“disparaging” to racial or ethnic groups, Section 2(a) embodied a 
restriction on speech that was patently unconstitutional.265 
 
260. Id. (citation omitted). 
261. Id. at 1765. 
262. Cf. Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1357 (“All of the government’s 
proffered interests boil down to permitting the government to burden speech it 
finds offensive.”). 
263. See id. at 1336 (“From its enactment in 1946 through its defense of the 
statute today, the government has argued that the prohibited marks ought not 
to be registered because of the messages the marks convey. When the 
government discriminates against speech because it disapproves of the 
message conveyed by the speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
264. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
265. Id. 
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Trademarks like “The Slants,” which are derogatory to Asian- 
Americans, were denied registration, while trademarks 
complimentary of Asians, like “Asian Efficiency,” were registered. 
There is no question that such patent and explicit government 
viewpoint-discrimination violates the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause, and the Court so agreed. Nor did any of the Justices 
buy into the government’s argument that registering trademarks 
turns them from private speech into “government speech.”266 
At another level, however, the legal issues in Matal v. Tam 
proved impossible for the voting members of the Supreme Court to 
agree upon.267 Though they were all clear that Section 2(a) was 
unconstitutional, the voting Justices could not agree on a single 
opinion for the Court as a whole.268 Instead, the splintered 
decisions devolved into disagreements about the complex and very 
difficult issue of commercial free speech cases, and the correct level 
of scrutiny. This dispute persisted even though all Justices agreed 
that Section 2(a)’s disparagement clause could not be justified 
under any level of scrutiny.269 
This was a missed opportunity. As this case shows, there are 
rare circumstances in which a law on its face violates the Free 
Speech Clause. The Court missed an opportunity to make a clear 
statement of this narrow but fundamental point of law. However, 
the debate is far from over. 
Even in this very narrow area of trademark law, there are 
other aspects of Section 2(a) that are vulnerable to a very similar 
free speech challenge. In particular, Section 2(a) also allows the 
government to refuse to register trademarks that are “immoral” or 
“scandalous.”270 The Federal Circuit en banc in the Tam case 
predicted that the outcome of this case might well doom those other 
aspects of Section 2(a) as well.271 They were right. Expect further 
 
266. Id. at 1760. 
267. See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion); id. at 1765 (Alito, J.) 
(plurality opinion). 
268. See id. at 1751 (Alito, J.) (majority opinion). 
269. Id. at 1764 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion). 
270. See supra text accompanying note 4 (quoting the text of Section 2(a) 
in full). 
271. See Tam En Banc Decision, 808 F.3d at 1330 n.1 (“We limit our 
holding in this case to the constitutionality of the § 2(a) disparagement 
provision. Recognizing, however, that other portions of § 2 may likewise 
constitute government regulation of expression based on message, such as the 
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exclusions of immoral or scandalous marks, we leave to future panels the 
consideration of the § 2 provisions other than the disparagement provision at 
issue here.” (emphasis added)). 
272. Since the Tam decision was issued by the Supreme Court, the Federal 
Circuit has already applied that precedent to find the Trademark Act’s bar on 
registering “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks to be unconstitutional under 
the Free Speech Clause. See In Re Brunetti, 877 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
In Brunetti, the Federal Circuit espoused the same constitutional theory that 
Judge Moore had originated in the Tam en banc decision—that strict scrutiny 
should apply whenever the government regulates the “expressive” aspects of 
commercial speech. See id. at 1349 (“Section 2(a) regulates the expressive 
components of speech, not the commercial components of speech, and as such 
it should be subject to strict scrutiny.”). This constitutional theory, however, 
was not endorsed or adopted in any of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Matal 
v. Tam. The Supreme Court’s failure to agree on a common legal rationale in 
Matal v. Tam has, clearly, left open key issues concerning the proper approach 
to free speech rights in the arena of commercial speech. 
